

# I

## OTHERWISE THAN HUMAN (TOWARD SOVEREIGNTY)

### 1. *“Man is a History and Has No Other Nature”*<sup>1</sup>

In our present intellectual climate (and indeed for a long time now) it appears that what we call being *human*, human subjectivity, my relation to myself (and to others), being *me* (or not)—these things, whatever they are, are without substance within most of our perspectives, whether conceptual or empirical, meaning that for philosophical and scientific research the concept of the human is either empty, or should be made so. The human has become a mythological or poetic concept, like Heidegger’s “gods and mortals,” easily replaceable by more up-to-date fictions (“We are all cyborgs now,” says Donna Haraway).<sup>2</sup> The French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard puts it neatly when he says that in our time the task of reason is “to make philosophy inhuman,” as if this were to be a kind of second-order secularization.<sup>3</sup> In the introduction to a collection of his essays entitled *The Inhuman* Lyotard frames two questions: “What if human beings, in humanism’s sense, were in the process of becoming inhuman? And what if what is ‘proper’ to humankind were to be inhabited by the inhuman?”<sup>4</sup>

What could these questions mean? Possibly no more than what social constructionists mean when they cite Michel Foucault’s famous line—“man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end.”<sup>5</sup> Or perhaps they

mean whatever eliminative materialists mean when they say that the concepts of folk psychology – consciousness, desire, feeling, self, etc. – are scientifically useless and should be got rid of.<sup>6</sup> The philosopher Cora Diamond says – and thinks of herself as alone in contesting the idea – that in our philosophical culture the human is at most a biological concept, or alternatively it is no more than an information-processing device, that is, one kind of intentional system among many others; the category of the human as such is no longer of any philosophical or moral interest.<sup>7</sup> Rather like madness (in its old, pre-clinical sense). But possibly the “end of man” is only what philosophers have always meant by their arguments or intimations that doing philosophy, being philosophical, is incompatible with being (merely) human. In Western culture the human is a border of self-transcendence but otherwise nothing it itself. “Can a human being be free of human nature?” asks Stanley Cavell. Perhaps only by becoming a monster, where the most monstrous thing is a being that looks human but turns out not to be.<sup>8</sup> As Daniel Dennett says, for all you know “some of your best friends may be zombies.”<sup>9</sup>

Of course, Cavell must be thinking of someone like Socrates, barefoot in the snow, standing for hours in meditation without the slightest bother, drinking the night through without getting drunk, spending the night in bed with the most beautiful man in Athens without getting an erection.<sup>10</sup> In Plato’s *Phaedo* philosophy as *ascesis* is explicitly a disciplined emancipation from human finitude, a kind of virtual death. Modern analytic philosophy, with its logical obsessions, its desire that things should match their concepts, and its despair over the failure of things to do so, is ascetic in much the same way. Cavell thinks that “there is inherent in philosophy a certain drive to the inhuman, to a certain inhuman idea of intellectuality, or of completion, or of the systematic; and that exactly because it is a drive to the inhuman, it is somehow itself the most

inescapably human of motivations.”<sup>11</sup> Recall Hegel’s account of the violence that consciousness inflicts on itself in order to transform itself into Spirit (*Geist*)—a task that requires it to rid itself of everything that is not itself, including perhaps its human embodiment.<sup>12</sup> After all, what happens when the task of *Aufhebung* is finished? In his lectures during the 1930s on the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Alexandre Kojève extracted from Hegel a famous thesis: “At the end of history man disappears” —but not to worry, he adds in a footnote, this is not “a cosmic catastrophe: the natural World remains what it has been from all eternity. And therefore, it is not a biological catastrophe either: Man remains alive as animal in *harmony* with Nature as given Being. What disappears is Man properly so-called—that is Action negating the given, and Error, or in general the Subject opposed to the Object.”<sup>13</sup> At the end of history we are at last free to enjoy our animal satisfactions.

But what is “man properly so-called,” especially since he has begun to replicate himself? In an essay entitled “Machines as Persons?,” Christopher Cherry writes: “it is virtually certain that machines which are on the face of it indistinguishable from human beings (and, doubtless, other creatures) will come on the scene sooner rather than later.”<sup>14</sup> Whenever they arrive, before as much as after, the major question will be: How should we treat these imitation humans? “The pressures to call them ‘persons,’” Cherry says, “will be immense” —and (he says) should be resisted on the grounds that if we begin to identify with these imitation humans we are likely to suffer a leveling that will leave us in a state of ontological indeterminacy (aliquids, whatchmacallits: neither human nor non-human but inhuman or, better—since the term “inhuman” is a moral concept that refers to acts of cruelty, of which animals are, according to tradition, incapable—*a*human; but who is “we”?).<sup>15</sup> Cherry proposes that we treat machine-persons the way we treat fictional characters in plays or novels (HB23).

Would this be humane? Daniel Dennett thinks that it would not. After all, we (humans) are ourselves, he says, “the direct descendents of...self-replicating robots,” that is, micromolecular systems of a certain complexity.<sup>16</sup> Dennett would side with Hilary Putnam’s argument that the question of whether machine-persons are in some sense conscious or alive “calls for a decision rather than a discovery,” and that now would be a good time (but of course he proposed this more than thirty years ago) to raise the question, “Should robots have civil rights?”<sup>17</sup> (And, of course, if robots, why not other creatures as well? Animal rights advocates like Peter Singer have for a long time been well ahead of this question.)<sup>18</sup>

## ***2. Other than Me***

Would these “rights” be the Rights of Man? The French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas remarks that the concept of the “Rights of Man” entails the paradox of the absolute alterity of every person. The human is what is refractory to categories and distinctions of every order, including the humanity of every humanism: “each man is the only one of his kind” (as if “man” were the word): there is no essence of man or human nature or human species. The human is the absolutely other as such (*Autrui*): “non-interchangeable, incomparable, unique, and irreproducible.”<sup>19</sup> As in Plato’s *Parmenides* – this is the late Plato who seems to have abandoned the theory of Forms – we are the others of each other, not of any One.<sup>20</sup> So we cannot be contained within a logic of identity or of exclusion or any bivalent (either/or) logic. The problem with humanism, Levinas thinks, is that with respect to human alterity “it is not sufficiently human.”<sup>21</sup> Humanism is concerned chiefly with the productive autonomy of the ego and the self-transparency of a consciousness exercising rational control.<sup>22</sup> In an essay on “Humanism and Anarchy,” Levinas says that since Descartes and Kant – that is,

in the philosophical culture of modernity—“man” is chiefly the name for the logical subject of objectifying consciousness, the representational-calculative “I” that produces an order of “anonymous structures” in which the human being as a singular and irreducible creature remains invisible.<sup>23</sup> Levinas writes: “As a setting into place of intelligible structures subjectivity can have no internal finality. We are witnessing the ruin of the myth of man [as] an end in himself, and the appearance of an order that is neither human nor nonhuman, one that is, indeed, ordered across man and across the civilizations he is said to have produced, but ordered in the last analysis by the properly rational force of the dialectical or logico-formal system” (CPP130).<sup>24</sup> As if the “human” subject were simply the indeterminate medium (“neither human nor nonhuman”) of a cybernetic or rule-governed rationality: a thinking thing, as Descartes figured it, with no need of a body.

By contrast, for Levinas, and for a number of his contemporaries in European philosophy, the human at the level of the singular—that is, “prior to the distinction between the particular and the universal” (OTB1108)—is not a *what* but a *who*; it is not the nominative *I* (*le Moi*) but the accusative *me* (*moi*).<sup>25</sup> The logical subject of cognition, rational deliberation, justified true beliefs and conduct beyond reproach—this subject is pure spirit, and is purely theoretical. The *who* or the *me* by contrast is corporeal, made of flesh or skin; it exists as a mode of sensibility or exposure to the touch. For Levinas, being *me* consists in being in a relation that he characterizes famously as “face-to-face.” It is an encounter with another in which the other is not just an object of perception, consciousness, or cognition, nor is it an adversary in a struggle for dominance, as in Hegel’s originary dialectic of master and slave. Being face-to-face with another is precisely the interruption of this dialectic as it is of every form of objectification; it is a relation in which I find myself (prior to any decision on my

part) existing for the *good* of the other, responsible for his or her welfare. In Levinas's thinking, I experience myself (for the first time) not as a *cogito* but in the claim that others have on *me*.

What sort of claim might this be? Jean-Paul Sartre in his famous analysis of the *look* treats this as an event of cognition, or more exactly a reversal of cognition in which I become another's representation, part of the furniture of another's consciousness: in other words, a mere object (being looked at, like being brought under a category, is an event of dehumanization).<sup>26</sup> Levinas maps onto this encounter another model—not the Greek or philosophical model of knowing and being known but the Jewish or biblical model of election—the prophetic experience of being summoned out of one's place of comfort and security and placed at the disposal of others. In this situation, I can no longer comport myself as a *cogito*, a subject of reason whether pure or practical, a consciousness conceived in terms of concepts and intentions. Gone likewise are all the basic characters of traditional moral philosophy: the moral spectator, the self-legislating rational actor, the calculator of means and ends, the emotive self, the theorist of the right and the good, the well-formed inhabitant of moral communities. The "ruin of the myth of man," indeed. In the relation of face-to-face, Levinas says, "the word *I* means *here I am* [*me voici*: see me here]," without shelter, no longer in a position of control, answerable to (and for) another (OTB114). The logical subject grasps the world conceptually (that is what the word "concept" means: *Begriff* in German derives from *greifen*, to grasp); being human is the reverse of this: "I am 'in myself' through the others," Levinas says. "The psyche is the other in the same.... Backed up against itself, in itself because without any recourse to anything, in itself like in its skin, the self in its skin both is exposed to the exterior (which does not happen to things) and obsessed by the others in this naked exposure" (OTB112). From a Greek standpoint (just to call it

that) Levinas's thinking, as he himself put it, "is simply something demented" (OTB113):

Vulnerability, exposure to outrage, to wounding, to passivity more passive than all patience, passivity of the accusative form, trauma of accusation suffered by a hostage to the point of persecution, implicating the identity of the hostage who substitutes himself for others: *all this is the self*, a defecting or defeat of the ego's identity (OTB15: my emphasis).<sup>27</sup>

Think of the cogito turned inside out and reincarnated:

It is because subjectivity is sensibility—an exposure to others, a vulnerability and a responsibility in the proximity of the others, the one-for-the-other...that a subject is of flesh and blood, a man that is hungry and eats, entrails in a skin, and thus capable of giving the bread out of his mouth, or giving his skin (OTB77).<sup>28</sup>

Not surprisingly, in "Signature" Levinas gives us an autobiography without an "I" or any self-reference: "heteronomy through and through."<sup>29</sup>

### **3. Self-Creation**

Stanley Cavell has, by contrast, a straightforwardly Greek approach to this issue: the human is not a natural kind, and in particular *my* humanness, my being human, is not a given; it has to be created (we are not beings but creatures). And after the death of God there are only two alternatives, neither of them certain of success: either I am a cultural product like any other, woven out of the stuff or tissue of material conditions, social relations, ideological systems, family romances, the law of the father, the cultural fabric (what Martin Hollis calls a

“plastic man” – “a socially programmed feedback system”); or I am my own creation, self-authored, responsible for my own existence, whatever I am.<sup>30</sup> Cavell affirms “the absolute responsibility of the self to itself,” which for him is the main thesis of what he calls “Emersonian perfectionism,” where the idea of having a self entails the obligation of self-formation, freeing oneself from the inertia of social construction.<sup>31</sup> As Cavell says, “the move from the state of nature to the contract of society does not, after all, sufficiently sustain human life” (CH52). Insofar as I'm simply shaped from the outside-in, I do not exist. Unless I “enact my existence” – that is Cavell’s phrase – I merely haunt the world, like a ghost.<sup>32</sup> How to enact one’s existence is not self-evident – there is no program, no set of spiritual exercises – but Cavell takes Descartes’s *cogito* as an instance of self-authoring, which is what Emerson makes of it in his essay, “Self-Reliance,” with its idea of self-creation from within a social environment of “bugs” and “spawn.”<sup>33</sup> The *cogito* in this respect is not just an argument or an inference; it is an act that we must perform, an originary task, a necessity of existence; but this is not just solitary singing. I do not exist until I am intelligible to others on my own terms (CH46-47). “Self-Reliance” is nevertheless about how we fall short. Likewise the theme of Thoreau’s *Walden* is that none of us is human (or, indeed, anything) yet, that the existence of the human has not yet occurred.<sup>34</sup> Would we recognize it if and when it does?

This question has a Sartrean ring. Jean-Paul Sartre’s idea is that in modernity we are all sub- or partially human, shaped from the outside by roles, functions, positions, offices, ranks, rules, types, and ready-to-wear name-tags of every kind.<sup>35</sup> Hence the existential double bind: “I am in the mode of not being what I am and of being what I am not” (BN365). In this event we are in no position to say what a fully human life might be.<sup>36</sup> There is no universal concept or principle in charge here (which is all that the motto “existence precedes

essence" means). But Sartre takes this absence of any given as a condition of freedom in which the individual, given what is possible in finite situations, faces the task of creating him or herself by way of decision and action: "The doctrine I am putting before you," Sartre says, "is...that there is no reality except in action. It goes further and adds, 'Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only insofar as he realizes himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is.'"<sup>37</sup> Being passive with respect to one's existence is just bad faith.

A comparable idea of self-creation is the principal thesis of Michel Foucault's later writings, where the point is to reinvent the ancient Greek practice of *epimeleia heautou*, "care of the self," which is a project of self-formation and autonomization through exercises of self-mastery.<sup>38</sup> Foucault emphasizes that his project is not a return to the Greeks; rather, as we learn (says Foucault) from Baudelaire, self-creation is precisely what constitutes modernity: "Modern man, for Baudelaire, is not the man who goes off to discover himself, his secrets and his hidden truth; he is the man who tries to invent himself. This modernity does not 'liberate man in his own being'; it compels him to face the task of producing himself."<sup>39</sup> Asked how his "aesthetics of the self" differs from Sartrean existentialism, Foucault replied: "I think that the only acceptable practical consequence of what Sartre has said is to link his theoretical insight [that the self is not something given to us] to the practice of creativity—and not that of authenticity. From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art" (EST262). To which Foucault added that his position is closer to Nietzsche's (*The Gay Science*, section 290) than to Sartre's. It is also echoed by Richard Rorty's "liberal irony," which is an up-to-date version of romantic irony's idea of "living poetically," composing oneself *ex nihilo*, as well as of Nietzsche's idea of "self-

knowledge as self-creation,” where “to fail as a *human* being...is to accept somebody else’s description of oneself, to execute a previously prepared program.”<sup>40</sup> And if we ask, what comes out in the end?, the answer is: at the level of particularity in which all that matters is *oneself*, anything goes. Hence the thick line that Rorty draws between private and public selves (CIS34). Basically we can only self-create in the dark. It is a process (Rorty thinks, as did Sartre) in which others tend to interfere.<sup>41</sup>

#### **4. Without Identity**

However, the matter is complicated if one follows the argument that at ground level my relationship to myself is apt to be (how shall we say?) *circumspect*, that is, not a relation of observation or reflection—nothing so clear and distinct as a *cogito*—but, as Manfred Frank puts it, simply a tacit experience of being on familiar terms with myself.<sup>42</sup> Theoretical categories of “subject” and “object” are inadequate to this familiarity, and so is the term “knowledge.” There is only *me*, Frank says, “whoever I am.”

I may be a brain swimming desolately in the vat of the experimentation of a sadistic neurobiologist (and whose nerve endings are connected to a supercomputer). Even when I know nothing more at all about my bodily appearance (because I have never seen myself in that circumstance, nor will I ever get to see me or in any other way perceive me)—even then, I can always grasp the thought, “My God, I wont let this happen again.” And the “I” in these thoughts refers with dead certainty to *me*, even when I have no perception and no description of myself. It is otherwise with the objective use of “I.” This occurs in propositions such as “I

have a bump on my forehead” or “I am standing next to the table.” In both cases “I” refers not to the logical subject of the thought but rather to my body (or a part of it or to its location, etc.)—but *that* this is so, I need not know. I need not feel the bump, and I may not have seen the table. I obtain this information only by perception. And in the case of direct epistemological self-reference there is nothing that I can fail to perceive or in whose identification I could go astray. “I” is just not an object of perception that I could identify as the self that has the perception (pp. 187-88).

In other words, familiarity with myself does not reach the level of self-knowledge or self-identity, much less self-representation; it is rather a finite form of acceptance, no doubt in equal parts recognition and resignation: this (something) is now happening to *me*, and so as time goes by, with all that happens, I grow accustomed to being *me*. Whether anything so substantive as a self, much less a *human* self, not to mention an “aesthetics of the self,” can be formed from this tacit state of affairs is an open question: being *me* may not all by itself be a ground or basis on which any edification could rely. After all, “who is *me*?” (and can it be made the subject or object of any predicate?).<sup>43</sup>

Who is me? Levinas would answer: “no one.” In an essay on “Bad Conscience and the Inexorable,” Levinas emphasizes the indirect or tacit nature of one’s awareness of oneself. On the one hand, consciousness as such is intentional, directed toward the world; on the other, as Husserl pointed out long ago, there is also consciousness of mental activity—but this (so-called) reflexive consciousness is, Levinas says, “without intentional aim,” nor can it be made the object of “the scrutinizing and thematizing and objectivizing and indiscreet eye of reflection”:

As a dim consciousness, an implicit consciousness preceding all intentions—or coming back from all intentions—it is not an act, but rather a pure passivity.... It is a “consciousness” that, rather than signifying self-knowledge, is effacement or discretion of presence. A bad conscience [*mauvaise conscience*: one could perhaps paraphrase, “poor consciousness”]: without intentions, without aims, under the protective mask of the personage contemplating himself in the mirror of the world, assured and positing himself. *This consciousness is without a name, without situation, without titles. A presence that dreads presence, naked of all attributes.* Its nudity is not that of disclosure or exposure to view of the truth. In its non-intentionality, prior to all willing and before all fault, in its non-intentional identification, identity recoils before its affirmation.... The interiority of mental life is, perhaps, originally this (my emphasis).<sup>44</sup>

Who is *me*? Levinas answers: “it is first a non-quiddity, no one, clothed with purely borrowed being, which masks its nameless singularity by conferring on it a role” (OTB106). Being oneself (*soi*) eludes one’s own grasp, as if one were a kind of Eurydice. “The oneself comes from a past that could not be remembered, not because it is situated very far behind, but because the oneself, incommensurable with consciousness which is always equal to itself, is not ‘made’ for the present.... It is the identity of the singular, modified only in the erosion of ageing, in the permanent loss of self. It is unsayable and thus unjustifiable” (OTB107). This is not, Levinas is quick to add, any kind of anthropocentric version of negative theology: “These negative qualifications of the subjectivity of oneself do not consecrate some ineffable mystery, but confirm

the presynthetic, prelogical and in a certain sense atomic, that is, in-dividual unity of the self, which prevents it from splitting, separating itself from itself so as to contemplate or express itself, and thus show itself, if only under a comic mask, to name itself otherwise than by a pro-noun" (OTB107). It is rather that I am a subjectivity without a subject—until I become subject to another's claim, redeemed (so to speak) by the accusative voice that summons me out of my clandestine self to exist for another. I am not I (whoever I may be) until another interrogates me.<sup>45</sup>

## 5. SOVEREIGNTY

But what if there were no Other? (A question no Levinasian has yet imagined.)

A text that addresses just this question in beautifully complex ways is Michel Tournier's novel, *Vendredi, Ou les limbes du Pacifique* (*Friday, Or: the Limbo of the Pacific*), a rewriting (or reinvention) of Daniel Defoe's *The Strange and Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe*. Defoe's novel, whatever else it is, is a master-narrative of bourgeois autonomy and self-sufficiency. Reduced to himself, deprived of a human world, Defoe's Crusoe certainly suffers his afflictions—fear, remorse, guilt, illness, loneliness, despair; but these afflictions do not affect his self-possession. His experience of himself and his predicament is painful, but it is not an experience of self-estrangement; on the contrary, his construction of a human economy from degree-zero (his "civilizing" of the island) is a parable of self-justification, an assertion of rational autonomy.

In Tournier's version everything is conceived differently. In the absence of others, Tournier's Crusoe undergoes (initially, and almost without noticing it) a transformation into something analogous to Giorgio Agamben's conception

“bare life” (*zo\_*), a condition of exteriority in which, by a sovereign decision (or occasion) of abandonment or banishment, a human being ceases to be regarded, experienced, or treated as human (may, for example, be killed with impunity).<sup>46</sup> Bare life is, so to speak, without predicates.

Interestingly, the first indication of Crusoe’s metamorphosis occurs in his encounter with an animal:

Looking around, he met the gaze of Tenn, the *Virginia’s* dog, a setter of doubtful breeding but warmly affectionate disposition. It had stopped a few yards away and was observing him with ears cocked and one forepaw raised. A great happiness flooded through Robinson. After all, he was not the only survivor of the wreck! He walked toward the animal, speaking its name. Tenn was one of those dogs who have an absolute need of human companionship, the sound of a human voice, and the touch of a human hand. It was strange, then, that instead of running to greet Robinson with his tail wagging he should have backed away, furiously growling, with teeth bared. He turned abruptly and bolted into the wood.<sup>47</sup>

Crusoe imagines that, in its castoff state, the dog has simply undergone a regression: “Perhaps they had been so long on the island that the dog had simply reverted to its natural, wild state. How long was it since the shipwreck? How many days, weeks, months, even years had passed. He was assailed with a kind of dizziness when he asked the question” (V32/F35) – for, indeed, Crusoe exists now in a condition in which the passing of time, and hence change itself, no longer registers as a fact of experience. But in fact it is Tenn, the dog, who is unchanged: being “one of those dogs who have an absolute need for human companionship, the sound of a human voice, the touch of a human hand,” Tenn

reacts as if Crusoe were no longer a human being. Only there is no *as if*. Tenn is simply bearing witness to what Crusoe has yet to discover, namely that *l'absence d'autrui* is a *force of dehumanization*, and that Crusoe is ceasing to be human. The question the novel raises is whether this is an altogether bad thing.

A critical turning point is Crusoe's failed effort to build a vessel that would enable him to escape the island (which he initially names *Desolation*); or, more exactly (since he does in fact construct such a thing, which he christens, appropriately, *Escape*), what is crucial is his failure to foresee that the vessel (a hollowed-out tree-trunk) is just too large and heavy transport to the water's edge. Pointedly, the failure does not surprise Crusoe; its possibility just never occurred to him—because the absence of others and their perspectives has eliminated “the category of the possible” from his horizon of experience.<sup>48</sup> However construed, the failure of foresight proves critical: in despair Crusoe abandons himself to “bare life,” becoming a creature that makes its home in a swamp:

Then a human form, like a statue of clay, rose and made its way through the reeds [*C'est alors qu'une statue de limon s'anima à son tour et glissa au milieu des joncs*: the translation *rehumanizes* Crusoe]. Robinson could not have said how long it was since he had left his last shred of clothing on some thornbush. In any case, the thought of sunburn no longer troubled him, since his back, flanks, and thighs were not protected by a thick coating of dried mud. His hair and beard had grown so long that his face was almost invisible beneath their tangled mass. His hands had become mere forepaws used for walking, since it made him giddy to stand upright. His state of physical weakness and the softness of sand and mud, but

above all the breaking of some little spring within his soul, had led him to move only on his hands and knees. He knew now that man resembles a person injured in a street riot, who can only stay upright while the crowd packed densely around him continues to prop him up. Exiled from the mass of his fellows, who sustained him as a part of humanity without his realizing it, he felt that he no longer had the strength to stand on his own feet. He lived on unmentionable foods, gnawing them with his face to the ground. He relieved himself where he lay, and rarely failed to roll in the damp warmth of his own excrement. He moved less and less, and his brief excursions always ended in his return to the mire (V38/F40).

Interestingly, in this state of “bare life” all that remains of Crusoe the man is his memory, and it is *this* (in the form of a hallucination in which Crusoe comes face-to-face with his sister, long since dead) that saves him, or at any rate leads him to realize that “Only a little more was needed to degrade him utterly and to drive him to the depths of madness. Under pain of death he must find the strength to tear himself away from it.... He must once again take his life in hand” (V42/F44).

At which point *Vendredi* becomes (almost) a novel of self-creation, not so much because Crusoe (as he does in Defoe’s version) re-civilizes himself in the bargain of civilizing the island – taking things, including himself, in hand turns out to be a failed and, indeed, blasted project – as because the island that he tries to tame (rechristened, in a utopian moment, *Speranza*) turns him into something autochthonous: his intimacy with the island is an achievement of a form of life free of the human order of things – and therefore, in the nature of the case, a bit

difficult to describe since it cannot “be translated into human language [*en termes humains*]” (V230/F212).

Crusoe’s apotheosis is made possible by the arrival of Friday, because Friday is himself outside the human order. As if full-blown from the brow of Rousseau, he is an unspoiled creature of natural self-sufficiency who seems incapable of any form of alienation (too bad that, as the novel intimates, he will in the end in all likelihood be sold into slavery). It is Friday who initiates Crusoe into a temporality in which time ceases to pass. By accident, Friday sets off a cache of explosives that obliterates much of what Crusoe has constructed on *Esperanza*, the result of which is to liberate from Crusoe from his work and from the time of work, that is from his past but also from any attention to the future or the time of possibility. As Crusoe expresses it in his journal: “*Formerly every day, hour, and minute leaned in a sense toward the day, hour, and minute that was to follow.... So time passed rapidly and usefully, the more quickly because it was usefully employed, leaving behind it an accumulation of achievement and wastage which was part of my history*” (V218/F203). The new temporality is the circular time of the sun in which Crusoe becomes ageless—“younger today than the pious and self-seeking young man who had set sail in the *Virginia*, not young with a biological youth, but with a mineral youth, solar and divine. Every day was for him a first beginning, an absolute beginning of the history of the world. Beneath the rays of the sun-god, *Speranza* trembled in an eternal present, without past or future. He could not forsake that eternal instant, poised at the needle-point of ecstasy, to sink back into a world of usury, dust, and decay” (V246/F226). Crusoe is only himself (who- or whatever that is) from the moment the sun rises until it sets; otherwise, as when others appear, he is in danger of regression.

The danger arrives in the form of a ship, the *Whitebird* from Blackpool, whose captain and crew come ashore to replenish their food and water supply,

which they do by literally plundering the island, making off with its fruit, vegetables, and goats. Rescue at last? At the appearance of the boat full of sailors Crusoe “had a vision, like that of a drowning man, of his whole life on the island—the building of the *Escape*, the mire, the frenetic cultivation of *Speranza*...the coming of Friday, the explosion—above all, the measureless extent of time during which his conversion to the sun had been completed in tranquil happiness” (V234/F216). Could he transport this solar form of life back to civilization? (Does he want to?) He regards the sailors and the captain (and, indeed, himself as one of them) with a kind of anthropological detachment or disinterest, realizing “that in former times he had been as they were, driven by the same motives of greed, arrogance, and violence, and that a part of him was still one with them” (V238/F220). However, watching Friday’s happy embrace of the ship, with its riggings and crosstrees that serve him as a kind of playground, Crusoe becomes “conscious of his own growing revulsion for this world [of the ship], into which he was being dragged, it seemed to him, against his will” (V242/F223)—a revulsion that increases when he encounters the unfortunate Jaan, the abused galley boy who constitutes the lowest form of life aboard ship (and so within the human order of things). As sunset arrives, he decides to remain on the island (meanwhile Friday chooses civilization; Jaan—with his red hair, the image of Robinson as a boy—deserts the ship to join Crusoe in his solitude).

What is the meaning of this decision to remain? (Who, or what, has Crusoe become?) In *The Inhuman* Lyotard asks: “What shall we call human in humans, the initial misery of their childhood, or their capacity to acquire a ‘second’ nature which, thanks to language, makes them fit to share in communal life, adult consciousness, and reason? That the second presupposes the first is agreed by everyone. The question is only that of knowing whether this dialectic,

whatever name we grace it with, leaves no remainder" (I3). Rousseau-like, Lyotard thinks that the child is "eminently the human," and that in the "civilizing process" we cease being human in the bargain of becoming productive citizens. "All education is inhuman," says Lyotard (I4-5). Hence Friday's absolute and carefree sovereignty.

On this line of thinking, what Tournier's Crusoe achieves is something like freedom from the "civilizing process" of which he was once the perfect embodiment when he extracted from Speranza a productive economy, producing for all the world a bourgeois order of domination and exchange. This freedom seems to be the conceptual point of the "solar experience" that rescues Crusoe from time and the idea that time must be put to use in behalf of the future. Here it becomes possible to read *Vendredi* as an allegory of Georges Bataille's conception of sovereignty. As Bataille says, "Life beyond utility is the domain of sovereignty."<sup>49</sup> Sovereignty is not Lockean or Kantian but anarchic—a condition of exteriority:

To know is always to strive, to work: it is always a servile operations, indefinitely resumed, indefinitely repeated. Knowledge is never sovereignty: to be *sovereign* it would have to occur in a moment. But the moment remains outside, short of or beyond, all knowledge. We know regular sequences in time, constants; we know nothing, absolutely, of what is not in the image of an operation, a servile modality of being, subordinate to the future, to its concatenation in time. We know nothing absolutely, of the moment (AS202).

Crusoe's solar experience is an experience of this moment of sovereignty outside time and the future—"the miraculous moment...when *anticipation dissolves into*

NOTHING" (AS207). It is an experience of the sacred – or, alternatively, it is an experience that transforms Crusoe into something sacred, something (in Bataille's words) outside "the subordination that characterizes the world": "the world of things or of practice...in which man is subjugated, or simply in which he serves some purpose, whether or not he is servant to another. Man is alienated therein, he is himself a thing." By contrast, "the sovereign man...alone enjoys a nonalienated condition. He alone has a condition comparable to that of the wild animal, and he is sacred, being above things" (AS214).

Sovereign Man: someone free of identity – someone no one or nor any system can track down or confine: and so perhaps no longer human, neither human nor nonhuman but a figure of alterity without reference to the same. The interesting question is: What sort of relation could we have with such a creature? Tournier's answer seems to lie in the young outcast, Jaan, who recognizes in Crusoe an alternative form of life, or at all events someone to be with – *mitsein*: a condition not available to Jaan in the human world that regards him as a thing. Recall Lyotard on "the initial misery of childhood." Jaan is perhaps now free, as is Crusoe, to be inhuman: than which there is perhaps no better (or anyhow freer) form of life.

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**NOTES TO “OTHERWISE THAN HUMAN”**

<sup>1</sup> The citation belongs to Joseph Margolis, *Texts without Referents: Reconciling Science and Narrative* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 38.

<sup>2</sup> See Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 145-61; and Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century,” *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 151.

<sup>3</sup> “After Wittgenstein,” *Political Writings*, trans. Bill Readings and Kevin Paul Geiman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 21.

<sup>4</sup> Jean-François Lyotard, *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 387. Social constructionists hold that human subjectivity is a social formation, a historical and cultural artifact. For a closely argued account of this idea see Joseph Margolis, *Life without Principles: Reconciling Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996). Being human is description-dependent, that is, occurs “only under a description,” and descriptions are historically and culturally contingent, that is, internal to local social practices. See Ian Hacking, “Making Up People,” *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought*, ed. Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), pp. 222-36, esp. pp. 230-31:

[On the] difference between people and things: what camels, mountains, and microbes are doing does not depend on our words.

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What happens to tuberculosis bacilli depends on whether or not we poison them with BCG vaccine, but it does not depend upon how we describe them. Of course we poison them with a certain vaccine in part because we describe them in certain ways, but it is the vaccine that kills, not our words. Human action is more closely linked to human description than bacterial action. A century ago I would have said that consumption is caused by bad air and sent the patient to the alps. Today, I may say that TB is caused by microbes and prescribe a two-year course of injections. But what is happening to the microbes and the patient is entirely independent of my correct or incorrect description, even though it is not independent of the medication prescribed. The microbes' possibilities are delimited by nature, not by words. What is curious about human action is that by and large what I am deliberately doing depends on the possibilities of description. To repeat, this is a tautological inference from what is now a philosopher's commonplace, that all intentional acts are acts under a description. Hence if new modes of description come into being, new possibilities for action come into being in consequence.

Instead of "social constructionism" Hacking speaks of "dynamic nominalism," which is just the idea that "numerous kinds of human being and human acts come into being hand in hand with our invention of categories labeling them" (p. 236). So there will always be new possibilities as to what a human being is. See Jacques Derrida's critique of anthropocentrism, "The Ends of Man," *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 109-36. Derrida's idea is that we can no longer isolate anything proper to human beings that sets them off from other creatures. When it comes to "man," he says, "one must speak several languages and produce several texts at once" (p. 135

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<sup>6</sup> See Paul Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," *Journal of Philosophy*, 78 (1981); reprinted in *A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), pp. 1-22 and esp. 111-29. Cf. Stephen Stich, *From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), and Patricia Churchland, *Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), pp. 299-310, esp. p. 302. In *Texts without Referents: Reconciling Science and Narrative* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1989), Joseph Margolis notes that "The eliminationist does not mean to describe or explain the *human*—he eliminates it altogether; what the term 'human' appears to affirm is ultimately not (he claims) actual or real. It, too, is to be eliminated, together with the baggage of its pretended world" (p. xiv). In *Content and Consciousness* (London: Routledge, 1969), Daniel Dennett says that, from the materialist's or, more accurately, the physicalist's standpoint,

The story we tell when we tell the ordinary story of a person's mental activities cannot be mapped with precision on to the extensional story of events in the person's body, nor has the ordinary story any real precision of its own. It has no precision, for when we say a person knows or believes this or that, for example, we ascribe to him no determinable, circumscribed, invariant, generalizable states, capacities, or dispositions. The personal story, moreover, has a relatively vulnerable and impermanent place in our [physicalist] conceptual scheme, and could in principle be rendered "obsolete" if some day we ceased to *treat* anything (any mobile body or system or device) as an Intentional system—by reasoning with it, communicating with it, etc. That day is not to be expected—and certainly not hoped for—in spite of the inroads that are now being made in 'impersonal' ways of controlling people (pp. 189-90).

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<sup>7</sup> Cora Diamond, "The Importance of Being Human," *Human Beings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 36-62, esp. 52-57. Cora Diamond's argument is that "our imaginative sense of what it is to be human" or to lead a human life is morally indispensable to human solidarity, particular with those (she emphasizes people who are retarded) who are not at all like us. See also Bernard Williams, "Making Sense of Humanity," *Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 79-89; and Mary Midgley, *Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature*, rev. ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), esp. Part IV ("Marks of Man"). The term "intentional system" is Daniel Dennett's and has application to machines and life-forms of every sort. See *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), pp. 3-22.

<sup>8</sup> *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 416.

<sup>9</sup> *Consciousness Explained* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1991), p. 73: "According to common agreement among philosophers, a zombie would be a human being who exhibits perfectly natural, alert, loquacious, vivacious behavior but is in fact not conscious at all, but rather some sort of automaton. The whole point of the philosopher's notion of zombie is that you can't tell a zombie from a normal person by examining external behavior. Since that is all we ever get to see of our friends and neighbors, *some of your best friends may be zombies.*"

<sup>10</sup> See Martha Nussbaum, "The Speech of Alcibiades: A Reading of the *Symposium*," *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 198-99. The idea is that Socrates is the first embodiment of a "philosophical self." "The philosophical self," according to Wittgenstein, "is not the human being, not the human body, not the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world – not a part of it" (*Tractatus* 5.641).

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<sup>11</sup> "An Interview with Stanley Cavell," *The Senses of Stanley Cavell*, ed. Richard Fleming and Michael Payne (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1989), p. 50.

<sup>12</sup> *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 31.

<sup>13</sup> *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 158.

<sup>14</sup> See Christopher Cherry, "Machines as Persons?" *Human Beings*, p. 24. See also Donna Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, pp. 149-81.

<sup>15</sup> See Mary Midgley on "The Beast Within," *Man and Beast*, pp. 36-44, esp. p. 43: "I do not think it is any accident that Plato, the first Greek who consistently wrote of the gods as good, was also the first active exponent of the Beast Within. Black horses, wolves, lions, hawks, asses, and pigs recur every time he mentions the subject of evil. This is not an idle stylistic device: there is no such thing in Plato. His serious view is that evil is something alien to the soul; something Other, the debasing effect of matter seeping in the through instinctive nature."

<sup>16</sup> Dennett, *Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), pp. 22-23. Cf. *Consciousness Explained*, pp. 431-48.

<sup>17</sup> "Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life?" *Mind, Language, and Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 386-408. The question of where or how robots stand within a human community is a main issue in Marge Piercy's novel, *He, She, and It* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1991), in which the progressive *homonization* of an automaton produces a dilemma for the town which he was created to defend: interaction with others, particularly the young woman assigned to instruct him in human responses, produces so human a robot

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that the townspeople are at a loss as to how to treat him. (Should it, for example, be allowed to vote?)

<sup>18</sup> *The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity*, ed. Paula Cavalieri and Peter Singer (London: Fourth Estate, 1993).

<sup>19</sup> "The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other," *Outside the Subject*, trans. Michael Smith (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 116.

<sup>20</sup> See 164c: "Obviously it must be true that they are others; if it were not, we could not be talking about 'the others.' And if we are talking about the others, things that are others must be different; 'other' and 'different' are two names for the same thing. Moreover, we speak of a thing as different from, or other than, something that is different from, or other than, it. So the others must have something to be 'other than.' What can this something be? Not the one, for there is no one. They must, then, be other than each other; that is the only possibility left, if they are not to be other than nothing."

<sup>21</sup> *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 128.

<sup>22</sup> See Louis A. Sass, "Humanism, Hermeneutics, and the Concept of the Human Subject," *Hermeneutics and Psychological Theory: Interpretive Perspectives on Personality, Psychotherapy, and Psychopathology*, ed. Stanley B. Messer, Louis A. Sass, Robert L. Woolfolk (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1988), pp. 222-71. Theodor Adorno has an interesting thesis in his *Aesthetic Theory*, namely that "Natural beauty vanished from aesthetics as a result of the burgeoning domination of the concept of freedom and human dignity, which was inaugurated by Kant and then rigorously transplanted into aesthetics by Schiller and Hegel; in accord with this concept nothing in the world is worthy of attention except that for which the autonomous subject has to thank itself." Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). p. 62.

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<sup>23</sup> *Collected Philosophical Papers*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 129.

<sup>24</sup> Compare Joseph Margolis, "Human Space: Systems, Holisms, Structuralisms," *Texts without Referents*, pp. 144-183. The "space" of modernity is, arguably, systematized, not only in the way it is construed philosophically but also in the way that it is constructed technologically, institutionally, bureaucratically, etc. Margolis's essay analyzes the multifarious "holisms" that our current intellectual culture uses to describe the order of things. Margolis's aim is, basically, "to get clearer about what sort of theories must be rejected in rejecting the thesis that the human world forms a system" (p. 152). Margolis has no patience with Levinas's "ineffabilism" (that is, the idea that the human cannot be conceptualized or brought under any description whatsoever), but he is closer to Levinas than he realizes. See also *Texts without Referents*, pp. 37-66, on the "technological self." Margolis is a rarity—an analytic historicist (or perhaps "culturalist") who believes that human beings are socially formed, and here confronts the problem of what sort of human being is formed within a technological culture.

<sup>25</sup> See *Who Comes After the Subject?*, ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy (London: Routledge, 1991). In this volume a number of French and German thinkers, including Levinas, respond to the following question posed by Jean-Luc Nancy:

*Who comes after the subject?* This question can be explained as follows: one of the major characteristics of contemporary thought is the putting into question of the instance of the "subject," according to the structure, the meaning, and the value subsumed under this term in modern thought, from Descartes to Hegel, if not to Husserl.

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The inaugurating decisions of contemporary thought...have all involved putting subjectivity on trial. A widespread discourse of recent date proclaimed the subject's simple liquidation. Everything seems, however, to point to the necessity, not of a "return to the subject" ...but on the contrary, of a movement forward toward someone – *some one* – else in its place.... Who would it be? (p. 5).

Compare the volume of essays, *Deconstructed Subjectivities*, ed. Simon Critchley and Peter Dews (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996); and also *The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy*, ed. Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995).

<sup>26</sup> *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1956), pp. 340-76.

<sup>27</sup> See Robert Bernasconi, "'Only the Persecuted...': Language of the Oppressor, Language of the Oppressed," *Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature, and Religion* (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 77-86. See also Rudolf Bernet, "The Other in Myself," *Deconstructive Subjectivities*, pp. 169-84.

<sup>28</sup> See Simon Critchley, "Prolegomena to Any Post-Deconstructive Subjectivity," *Deconstructive Subjectivities*, p. 30: "Levinas's work offers a *material phenomenology of subjective life*, where the conscious I of representation is reduced to the sentient I of enjoyment. The self-conscious, autonomous subject of intentionality is reduced to a living subject that is subject to the conditions of its existence. Now for Levinas it is precisely this I of enjoyment that is capable of being claimed or called into question ethically by the other person. Ethics, for Levinas, is simply

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and entirely this calling into question of myself—of my spontaneity, of my *jouissance*, of my freedom—by the other.”

<sup>29</sup> *Difficult Freedom: Essays in Judaism*, trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp. 291-95.

<sup>30</sup> See Martin Hollis, *Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 5-11, 23-39; and Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, p. 465: “we are apt to be struck with the idea of the human being as a *creature*, meaning a living thing, something procreated; but meaning equally something created. Then we seem to have the following choice. Either we attempt to give up the idea of the human being as created, in which case we attempt to *naturalize* the human being, to understand this being in relation to (non-human) nature, an attempt sometimes described as locating the human being’s *place* in nature; or else we retain the idea of ourselves as created and attempt further to *humanize* this creation, identifying ourselves now as the creators of ourselves, since obviously no *other* being could be eligible for such a role.”

<sup>31</sup> *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. xxvii. Cavell is careful to point out that this responsibility to oneself does not close out other people but requires that one make oneself intelligible to others, creating a voice of one’s own that others recognize. I try to sort out the relation of self and other in Cavell’s philosophy in “The Last Romantic: Stanley Cavell and the Writing of Philosophy,” *Tragic Thoughts at the End of Philosophy: Language, Literature, and Ethical Theory* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999), pp. 199-217.

<sup>32</sup> “Being Odd, Getting Even,” *In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 108; and also *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome*, pp. 47-48. Cf. Marcel Mauss’s distinction between the *personne* and the *moi*, “A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion

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of the Person; the Notion of the Self," trans. W. D. Halls, *The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History*, ed. Michael Carruthers, Steven Collins, Steven Lukes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 1-25. The *personne* (in French this also means "no one") is a social construction, an inhabitant and also an embodiment of a culture (arguably premodern: the tribesman, the peasant); the *moi* is the autonomous, self-reflexive ego capable of self-definition (arguably modern: the figure of Rousseau comes to mind).

<sup>33</sup> Cavell seems to hold to Kant's idea that identifies humanity with autonomy. See *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome*, where Cavell glosses Emerson's line from "Self-Reliance" that we are only "bugs, spawn": "Our moralized shame is debarring us from the conditions of the moral life, from the possibility of responsibility over our lives, from responding to our lives rather than bearing them dumbly or justifying them automatically. That debarment or embarrassment is for Emerson, as for Kant, a state other than the human, since it lacks the humanly defining fact of freedom. That we are perceived as 'bugs' says this and more. Bugs are not human, but they are not monsters either; bugs in human guise are inhuman, monstrous" (*Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome*, p. 48). Compare Heidegger on the "they" (*das Man*) in *Being and Time*, sections 25-27.

<sup>34</sup> See Cavell, *The Senses of Walden: An Expanded Edition* (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1981), pp. 102-110; and "Emerson's Constitutional Amending: Reading 'Fate,'" *Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995), pp. 12-41, esp. p. 34.

<sup>35</sup> Recall the parable of the café waiter who turns himself into a thing: "His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid.... Finally, there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tightrope walker.... He applies to himself to chaining his movements as if they were

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mechanisms, the one regulating the other; his gestures and even his voice seem to be mechanisms; he gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things.... Society demands that he limit himself to his function" (BN101-2).

<sup>36</sup> See Elizabeth Bowen and Robert Stone, "'Making the Human' in Sartre's Unpublished Dialectical Ethics," *Writing the Politics of Difference*, ed. Hugh Silverman (Albany, N. Y.: SUNY Press, 1991), pp. 111-22.

<sup>37</sup> "Existentialism is a Humanism," *Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre*, ed. Walter Kaufman (New York: Meridian Books, 1989).

<sup>38</sup> *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 3: *The Care of the Self*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1988), esp. pp. 37-68.

<sup>39</sup> "What is Enlightenment?" *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984*, Vol. 1: *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, trans. Robert Hurley, et al. (New York: The New Press, 1997), p. 312).

<sup>40</sup> "The Contingency of Selfhood," *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 27-28. On romantic irony as "living poetically," see Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Irony*, pp. 279-32. Cf. Friedrich Schlegel, *Critical Fragments*: "A really free and cultivated person ought to be able to attune himself at will to being philosophical or philological, critical or poetical, historical or rhetorical, ancient or modern: quite arbitrarily, just as one tunes an instrument at any time and to any degree" (Fr. 55).

<sup>41</sup>See Ted Preston, "The Public and the Private Appeal of Self-Fashioning," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 31 (2006), 10-19.

<sup>42</sup> "Is Subjectivity a Non-Thing, an Absurdity [*Unding*]? On Some Difficulties in Naturalistic Reductions of Self-Consciousness," *The Modern Subject*, pp. 177-97.

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<sup>43</sup> Here one might ask what gets lost in theories that emphasize narrative constructions of the self. [insert Ricoeur and MacIntyre]. Possibly what gets left out of narrative constructions of the self is *me*.

<sup>44</sup> *Of God Who Comes to Mind*, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 173-74.

<sup>45</sup> A statement that Paul Ricoeur, among others, finds intolerable. See Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 335-41. In *Otherwise than Being*, Ricoeur complains, Levinas employs “hyperbole to the point of paroxysm” (p. 338). Ricoeur’s interest is in narrative as a mode of self-construction: I am not I until I can give an account of myself (see “The Self and Narrative Identity,” pp. 140-68).

<sup>46</sup> *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 1-12. See Michael Marder, “Taming the Beast: The Other Tradition in Political Theory,” *Mosaic*, 39, no. 4 (December 2006), 47-60. Marder sensibly asks why animals (rather than outcast humans) are not a prime example of “bare life” (48).

<sup>47</sup> (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1972), p. 32; trans. Norman Denny (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), p. 34.

<sup>48</sup> See p. 36/38:

He discovered that for all of us the presence of other people [*autrui*] is a powerful element of distraction, not only because they constantly break up our activities and interrupt our train of thought, but because the mere possibility of their doing so illumines a world of concerns situated at the edge of our

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consciousness but capable at any moment of becoming its center. That marginal and almost ghostly [*fantomatique*] presence of things with which he was not immediately concerned had gradually vanished from Robinson's mind. He was now surrounded by objects subject only to the arbitrary law of all or nothing, and thus it was that, being wholly absorbed in the business of building the ship, he had completely overlooked the problem of launching her.

See Gilles Deleuze, "Michel Tournier and the World without Others," *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 306: "What happens when Others [*autrui*] are missing from the structure of the world? In that case, there reigns alone the brutal opposition of the sun and the earth, of an unbearable light and an obscure abyss: the 'summary law of all or nothing.' The known and the unknown, the perceived and the unperceived confront one another in a battle without nuances.... A harsh and black world, without potentialities or virtualities: the category of the possible has collapsed."

<sup>49</sup> *The Accursed Share*, vols. II & III, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1993), p. 198.